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CIVIL RIGHTS - STATE PRISONERS MAY CHALLENGE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PAROLE PROCEDURES
UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - WILKINSON v. DOTSON, 125 S.

CT. 1242 (2005)
Federal prisoner litigation most often arises under either 42 U.S.C. §
1983 or the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.' In 1973, the
United States Supreme Court announced an exception to the broad language of § 1983 when it held that a prisoner must bring a suit for equitable
relief that challenges "the fact or duration of confinement" as a habeas
corpus petition. 2 The Court later expanded the habeas exception to § 1983
federal prisoner litigation to all claims in which the prisoner's success
would "necessarily demonstrate[] the invalidity of the conviction. 3 In
Wilkinson v. Dotson,4 the Court limited the exception when it held that a

1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing remedy for all persons in the United States
who suffered constitutional deprivations at the hands of a person acting "under color" of
state law). The federal habeas statute provides in part that:
(a) [A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that -

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the court of the
State;
(B)(i) or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process;
(ii) or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner...
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the court of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
2 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973) (holding that habeas relief is
avenue for prisoner relief when conviction or sentence at issue).
3 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1994) (denying prisoner's § 1983
claim because success would imply conviction was wrong).
4 125 S.Ct. 1242 (2005).
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prisoner may pursue a § 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of
parole eligibility and parole determination procedures. 5
Two Ohio state prisoners, William Dwight Dotson and Rogerico
Johnson, filed separate § 1983 suits against the state parole authority alleging that state parole procedures violated their constitutional rights.6 An
Ohio court sentenced Dotson to life in prison in 1981, when Ohio law provided that Dotson must serve fifteen years before he was eligible for parole.7 The Ohio Parole Board did not release Dotson at his first parole
hearing in 1995, postponed his second hearing for ten years, and scheduled
a halfway review for the year 2000.8
The Ohio legislature enacted new parole guidelines in 1998 that differed from the guidelines in force when a court convicted Dotson. 9 At his
halfway review in March 2000, the Parole Board applied the new guidelines and ruled that Dotson must serve 32.5 years to be eligible for parole.' °
Dotson filed suit under § 1983 challenging the Parole Board's application
of the 1998 guidelines to determine his parole eligibility.'
Rogerico Johnson entered an Ohio prison in 1992 to serve a ten to
thirty year sentence. 2 Only one board member presided at Johnson's parole hearing, Johnson was not permitted to address the Board member
orally, and the Board member's decision to deny Johnson parole relied on
5 See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1248 (2005) (upholding prisoner's §
1983 claim because success on merits will only lead to another parole eligibility hearing).
6 See Dotson v. Wilkinson, 329 F.3d 463, 465-66 (6th Cir. 2003) (rehearing en banc)

(explaining procedural history of both claims); Dotson v. Wilkinson, No. 3:00 CV 7303
(N.D. Ohio, Aug. 7, 2000); Johnson v. Ghee, No. 4:00 CV 1075 (N.D. Ohio, July 16, 2000).
See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1245 (articulating Dotson and Johnson's prayers for relief
under § 1983). William Dwight Dotson and Rogerico Johnson sought declaratory and
injunctive relief in pursuit of a new parole eligibility hearing and a parole determination
hearing, respectively. Id.
7 See Dotson v. Wilkinson, 300 F.3d 661, 662 (6th Cir. 2002) (describing events
leading to Dotson's cause of action); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.13(B) (West
1972) (stating that prisoner serving life sentence must serve fifteen years before first parole
eligibility hearing); § 2967.13(B) (mandating that prisoner not released at initial parole
proceeding entitled to parole hearing within five years).
8 See Dotson, 300 F.3d at 662 (stating Ohio Parole Board's decision with respect to
Dotson).

9 See id. (outlining history of Ohio parole eligibility statute);

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2967.13 (West 1998) (allowing Ohio Parole Board to consider seriousness of crime and
inmate's violent nature to determine parole eligibility); id. (providing that prisoner denied
parole at fifteen year mark not entitled to second hearing for ten years and never entitled to
halfway hearing). With respect to Dotson's parole eligibility, the Parole Board considered
the seriousness of the offense. See Dotson, 300 F.3d at 662 (articulating how Parole Board
applied new procedures to Dotson).
10 See Dotson, 300 F.3d at 662-63 (stating Parole Board's halfway parole determination to retroactively apply new parole guidelines).
11 See id. (stating Dotson's constitutional challenges to parole procedures).
12 See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1245 (2005) (describing facts giving rise
to Johnson's § 1983 claims).

[20061

CASE COMMENT: 125 S. CT. 1242

13
two alleged convictions that the State did not pursue against Johnson.
Additionally, the Parole Board applied the 1998
guidelines that were not in
4
Johnson.1
convicted
court
Ohio
an
force when
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed Dotson's suit, sua
sponte.'5 The district court found that Dotson's claim could not proceed
because "'a judgment on the merits would affect the validity of [his] conviction or sentence, [and his] conviction or sentence has [not] been previously set aside.""16 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Dotson's § 1983 claim was valid because a new
parole eligibility hearing did not "'challenge ... the fact or duration of his
confinement" and "even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity
of an outstanding criminal judgment against" him.17
On rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit held that both suits could
proceed under § 1983 because success on the inmates' complaints would
not "necessarily imply the invalidity of [their] convictions."' 8 The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the prisoners, if successful, would not automatically
receive a shortened prison sentence because the Board considers multiple
factors to grant parole. 19 The Ohio Parole Board appealed, and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a prisoner may
challenge the constitutionality of state parole procedures under § 1983 .20
The federal habeas corpus statute and § 1983 are the two primary
mechanisms that prisoners use to challenge violations of their constitu-

13 See id. (stating events that Johnson alleges transpired at his parole determination
hearing).
14 See id. (stating facts giving rise to Johnson's § 1983 claims). The Ohio Code required that (1) the Parole Board or one member of the board and one Parole Hearing Officer
conduct the hearing; (2) the Board must review the inmate's oral and written statements and
(3) the Board may not consider allegations of the inmate's wrongdoing if the inmate was
not charged with such wrongdoing. See Dotson v. Wilkinson, 329 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir.
2003) (rehearing en banc) (explaining Ohio parole hearing requirements).
15 See Dotson, 300 F.3d at 663 (dismissing Dotson's suit before defendants served
with process and without notice to defendants); id. (listing names of defendants to Dotson's
§ 1983 suit). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2000) (providing grounds for dismissal of informa pauperis action).

16 See Dotson, 300 F.3d at 663 (stating reasons that district court dismissed Dotson's

claim).
'7

See id. at 666 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).

18 See Dotson v. Wilkinson, 329 F.3d 463, 471-72 (6th Cir. 2003) (consolidating
Dotson's and Johnson's lawsuits); id. (holding that both prisoners have cognizable claims
under § 1983 because neither plaintiff asserts actual entitlement to parole or shorter sentence).
19 See id. (reasoning that plaintiffs' sentences would not be shorter nor would their
convictions be tainted).
20 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 541 U.S. 935 (2004).
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tional rights.21 Most prisoners prefer to sue under § 1983 because, unlike a
§ 1983 action, habeas relief requires prisoners to exhaust all state remedies
and damage awards are not available in habeas relief.22 Despite the apparent applicability of § 1983 to a prisoner's lawsuit, the United States Supreme Court held that the sole federal remedy for a prisoner challenging
"the fact or duration of his confinement" is habeas corpus because allegations of wrongful confinement go to the "core of habeas corpus. 23
In Preiserv. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that
§ 1983 challenges to prison disciplinary procedures that deny good time
21 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 476, 486 (1973) (stating that language of §
1983 encompasses § 1983 prisoner litigation along with federal habeas statute); Jason A.
Jones, Note, Prisoner Litigation and the Mistake of Jenkini v. Haubert, 86 CORNELL L.
REv. 140, 141 (2000) (noting that § 1983 and federal habeas statute are "the two most
common sources of federal court prisoner litigation").
22 See Preiser,411 U.S. at 489 (stating Congress intended that prisoners exhaust state
remedies prior to seeking federal habeas relief); Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)
(holding federal habeas relief not available until state remedies exhausted); see also Patsy v.
Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (holding that civil litigants not required to
exhaust state remedies before filing § 1983 suit because Congress did not intend an exhaustion requirement). The exhaustion requirement stems from the federal government's respect for state criminal proceedings, an issue not of concern when an individual claims
constitutional injuries from state actions. See Preiser,411 U.S. at 490 (recognizing purpose
of habeas exhaustion requirement is "to avoid the unnecessary friction between the federal
and state court systems" and to afford "the state court system an opportunity to correct its
own constitutional errors"); Patsy, 457 U.S. at 507 (stating that exhaustion requirement is
contrary to legislative intent behind § 1983); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982)
(noting that habeas exhaustion requirement protects state enforcement of federal law and
state adjudications); Rovall, 117 U.S. at 251 (reasoning that exhaustion requirement preserved ability of state and federal courts to protect constitutional rights). See also Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (holding that federal courts will not review challenges to
ongoing state criminal proceedings as "a proper respect for state functions"); see generally
Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63, n.10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574
(1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249,
251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
312, n.4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). But see Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 41 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (stating, "No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted"); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
520 (2002) (holding that prisoners must exhaust prison administrative grievance process
before bringing § 1983 suit).
23 Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489; see In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 261 (1894) (granting
habeas relief to prisoner challenging validity of conviction); Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d
379, 380-82 (7th Cir. 1991) (declaring that prisoner seeking release, more lenient parole,
probation, or prison procedures is limited to federal habeas relief while prisoner seeking
new prison location or program is challenging conditions of confinement). Cf Osborne v.
District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District, 423 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir.
2005) (interpreting Preiser and Wilkinson to mean that § 1983 prisoner lawsuits not precluded if habeas relief is also proper); Franceski v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 04 Civ. 8667
(LBS), 2005 WL 821703, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 8, 2005) (reasoning that "some claims
might be cognizable both under § 1983 and in a habeas action").
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credits go to the "core of habeas corpus" because a prisoner's success on
the merits of his claim would result in a shorter prison sentence. 24 The
Court also intimated that if habeas relief is available, § 1983 suits are not
because principles of federalism mandate that the States have the first
chance to remedy errors in prison administration. 25 A prisoner may, however, challenge "the wrong procedures, not ... the wrong result" because
the suit does not implicate the "core of habeas corpus. ,,26
The Preisercourt noted that a prisoner's prayer for equitable remedies is a clear attack on "the fact or duration of confinement," but a prisoner's suit for damages could be cognizable under § 1983.27 Later, the
Court closed the door on § 1983 prisoner suits for damages where "judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence., 28 In Heck v. Humphrey, a prisoner brought a §
1983 suit for damages for, among other claims, malicious prosecution. 29
The Court held that because one element of a malicious prosecution claim
is that the criminal proceeding end in the prisoner's favor, success on the
merits of his claims would negatively impact his conviction. 30 An excep-

24

See Preiser,411 U.S. at 486-89 (denying state prisoner prayer for equitable relief

for denial of good time credits because restoration of good time credits leads to shorter
prison sentences which is a challenge to confinement). But see Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S.
546 (1964) (per curiam) (permitting prisoner § 1983 claim alleging that prison denied him
privileges and right to purchase religious materials). See also Preiser,411 U.S. at 477
(explaining that good time credits reduce prisoner's sentence in exchange for prisoner's
good behavior).
25 See Preiser,411 U.S. at 492 (reasoning that prisoners must exhaust state remedies
in state administrative and judicial proceedings because strong state interest in prison administration which is "most efficiently and properly handled" by the state); Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) (stating that federal courts have "broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief ... [and] to provide the State an opportunity to
correct the constitutional violation found by the court").
26 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1994) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555 (1974)); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555 (holding that declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 are available to prisoner alleging that prison's disciplinary procedures are unconstitutional).
27 See Preiser,411 U.S. at 494 (dictum) (implying there is no exhaustion requirement
for prisoner seeking damages).
28 Heck, 512 U.S. at 481-82; see also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004)
(denying § 1983 prisoner suit for damages unless he obtains "favorable termination" of
conviction); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (dictum) (recognizing prisoner suit
for damages under § 1983 provided that underlying conviction not implicated); DeWalt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that prisoner § 1983 action permissible when habeas not available remedy); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 21 (2nd Cir.
1999) (holding that prisoner challenging conditions of confinement may bring § 1983 action
where habeas not appropriate).
29 See Heck 512 U.S. at 484 (detailing charges in prisoner's complaint).
30 See id. at 484-86 (reasoning that damages award in federal court would result in
conflicting outcomes in state criminal court and federal court); Abusaid v. Hillsborough
County Board of County Commissioners, No. 03-16243, 2005 WL 858296, at *16 n.9 (11 th
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tion to this rule is if the prisoner can show that a court reversed his prior
conviction on direct appeal, an executive order expunged his prior conviction, or a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus called his prior
conviction into question.31
The Court subsequently declared invalid § 1983 prisoner lawsuits
that challenged prison disciplinary procedures if the suit threatened the
underlying conviction.32 For example, in Edwards v. Balisok, the Court
held that allegations of "deceit and bias on the part of the decision maker,"
if successful, would "necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of
good time credits. 3 3 Conversely, prisoner attacks on prison disciplinary
procedures under § 1983 are cognizable if they concern the conditions of
confinement.34

Although the Court did not expressly define the relationship of §
1983 to prisoner attacks on parole eligibility and parole determination before Wilkinson, federal courts often adjudicated parole challenges under the
federal habeas statute. 35 The circuit courts, however, generally hold that an
Cir. April 15, 2005) (interpreting Heck as "an exception to the availability of § 1983 relief
in cases in which habeas provides a remedy").
31 See Heck, 511 U.S. at 486-87 (holding that § 1983 damages available to prisoner
only if conviction or sentence resolved in favor of prisoner).
32 See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997) (denying prisoner § 1983 claim
challenging constitutionality of procedures that denied him good time credits because implicated length of confinement); see also Jason A. Jones, Note, PrisonerLitigation and the
Mistake of Jenkins v. Haubert, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 140, 166 (2000) (supporting Edward's
broad application of Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings because prisoners should not
sidestep habeas requirements).
33Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646. The Court noted that the prisoner could, under § 1983,
pursue an injunction precluding unconstitutional procedures because prospective relief does
not necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior loss of good time credits. Id. at 648; see also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55 (1974) (holding that prisoner could seek a declaratory judgment "as a predicate to a damages award" under § 1983 and an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of unlawful prison regulations concerning revocation of good-time
credits because both forms of relief are prospective). But see Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.
1, 17 (1998) (stating that Heck inapplicable to § 1983 prisoner suits where prisoner challenges procedure, not result, prison issued); Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for the
Third Judicial District, 423 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting state's argument that
prisoner's § 1983 action barred if prisoner's claim will "set the stage" to later challenge his
conviction).
34 See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004) (per curiam) (upholding prisoner § 1983 suit against correction officer for misconduct during prison disciplinary proceedings because it challenged conditions of confinement); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249, 251-52 (1971) (per curiam) (upholding prisoner § 1983 suit challenging living
conditions and prison disciplinary measures concerning living conditions); Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that inmate attacks on prison work release
regulations challenge prison conditions).
35 See California Dept. of Corrs. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 503 (1995) (stating that
prisoner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus to challenge constitutionality of parole
suitability proceedings). Morales was entitled to annual parole determination hearings
following the denial of his initial parole application under the California parole statute in
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inmate may file § 1983 suits challenging the constitutionality of parole
eligibility procedures. 36 In particular, the Sixth Circuit permitted several
Ohio inmates to pursue a § 1983 action alleging due process violation in
the parole process.37
In Wilkinson v. Dotson,3 8 the United States Supreme Court considered whether state prisoners have cognizable claims under § 1983 to question the constitutionality of state parole procedures. 39 The Wilkinson court
held that prisoners are not limited to habeas relief when challenging the
constitutionality of state parole procedures because success on the merits

force in 1980, the time of his conviction. Id. at 503. The California legislature amended
the statute in 1981, allowing the parole board to delay parole determination hearings for up
to three years if the conviction was for taking a life and it was unlikely the prisoner would
be paroled within that three year period. Id. The parole board found Morales satisfied both
factors and delayed his next parole determination hearing for three years. Id.; see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from passing ex post facto laws); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 241 (1963) (holding that paroled person may still file petition for
writ of habeas corpus to challenge parole conditions); Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 321
F.3d 374, 376 (3rd Cir. 2003) (noting that prisoner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus to
challenge retroactive application of state parole laws enacted after his conviction); Nulph v.
Faatz, 27 F.3d 451, 452 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that prisoner filed petition for writ of habeas
corpus because state parole board used post-conviction parole laws to determine parole
eligibility); Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining that prisoner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies to challenge
application of new parole laws to his eligibility proceedings).
36 See Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding § 1983
prisoner litigation permissible unless prisoners "want to challenge their convictions, their
sentences, or administrative orders revoking good-time credits or equivalent sentence shortening devices ... because they contest the fact or duration of custody"); Anyanwutaku v.
Moore, 151 F. 3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declaring that inmate may file § 1983 suit
attacking constitutionality of prison's calculation of parole eligibility date because new
parole eligibility hearing does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence); Carson
v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that inmate may file § 1983 suit to
challenge unconstitutional conditions of confinement and procedures so long as it will not
expedite his release); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that
inmate may file a § 1983 suit to challenge classification as sex offender because successful
result would only determine eligibility for parole and would not expedite his release); Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333, 335-36 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that prisoners may challenge conditions of confinement "or the method by which a sentence is being carried out"
under § 1983); but see Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 ( 9 th Cir. 1997) (stating that
challenges to parole denials "implicate the validity of continued confinement" even if parole board employed improper procedures to reach its conclusion).
37 See Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233,
236 ( 6 th Cir. 1991) (denying inmate's § 1983 claims on the merits). The Sixth Circuit rejected the prisoners' claims that the parole authority denied them due process when the
parole board did not immediately grant parole after a hearing. Id. at 234. Rather than holding the suit must be brought as a habeas proceeding, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the merits
of the claim and held that the inmates did not have a liberty interest in being released on
parole at a particular time. Id. at 237.
38 125 S. Ct. 1242 (2005).
39 See id. at 1244-45 (setting forth legal question at issue).
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of such actions "would [not] necessarily spell speedier release" and do not
go to "the core of habeas corpus., 40 The Court articulated a concise rule
encompassing all prior case law concerning prisoner litigation under §
1983:
A state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state
conduct lead to conviction or internal prison proceedings) if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of confinement or duration.41
The Court then rejected Ohio's contention that the prisoners are
challenging their confinement because the ultimate goal is to be released
from prison sooner. 42 With respect to Dotson's claim concerning Ohio's
parole eligibility procedures, the Court held that forcing the Ohio Parole
Board to consider another parole application will not necessarily invalidate
his conviction or sentence because the Board still has discretion not to
grant parole.43 Similarly, Johnson's demand for a new parole determina-

40

See id. at 1248 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)) (explain-

ing future implications if Dotson and Johnson prevail in their respective lawsuits).
41 See id. at 1248 (summarizing prior case law concerning prisoner litigation). The
Court stated prior case law indicates that prisoner litigation under § 1983 is permissible
when an inmate asks for a declaratory judgment that prison procedures are unconstitutional
and an injunction precluding future application of the unconstitutional procedures. See id. at
1246-47 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641, 648 (1997)). Conversely, injunctions for wrongful denial of good time credits,
unconstitutional procedures denying good time credits and damages for an unconstitutional
conviction are not permitted under § 1983, and must be brought as a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, because they challenge the legality of the prisoner's continued confinement.
See id. at 1245-48 (citing Preiser,411 U.S. at 487-88; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 553; Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994)).
42 See Wilkinson 125 S. Ct. at 1245-46 (articulating Ohio's rationale to relegate
prisoner challenges to parole procedures to habeas relief because the prisoner's ultimate goal is
earlier release). The Court also rejected two additional arguments Ohio advanced to preclude the § 1983 claims. Id. at 1249. Ohio posited that: (1) parole proceedings constitute
part of a prisoner's sentence and any challenge thereto violates Heck's bar on actions that
"necessarily imply the invalidity of [the prisoner's] ...sentence;" and (2) that allowing the
prisoners' claims to proceed is contrary to principles of federal/state comity. Id. (emphasis
in original). The Court narrowly construed the word sentence as referring only to the original punishment issued upon conviction, not subsequent prison procedures. Id. Ohio's
second argument was invalid because the Court previously weighed comity issues when it
set forth the rule that § 1983 actions may not imply the invalidity of a state prison sentence.
Id.
43 See supra note 35.
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tion proceeding will not guarantee a quicker prison release because that
decision is at the Board's discretion. 44
Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring, posited that the right to release is not implicated in a prisoner's challenge to procedural deficiencies
during a state's discretionary parole proceeding.45 Thus, because habeas
relief was not initially available Dotson46and Johnson, § 1983 is a permissible legal avenue to pursue their claims.

Justice Kennedy, dissenting, maintained that the constitutionality of
parole procedures goes to the duration of the prisoner's confinement.47
Habeas relief should be "the exclusive vehicle" for parole challenges.48
Furthermore, as a matter of comity, the propriety of state parole procedures
is a state matter and the Court's decision "deprives the federal courts of the
invaluable assistance and frontline expertise found in the state courts.
The Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson allows a prisoner to
challenge state parole procedures under § 1983, but does not preclude the
same challenge under the federal habeas statute. 50 Heavily relying on
Heck's requirement that a prisoner's § 1983 suit is barred if it would "necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the conviction," the Court narrowed
the scope of prison procedures that would lead to earlier prison releases to
allow § 1983 challenges to parole procedures. 51 Based on this limited
definition, the Court accurately concluded that Dotson properly brought his
demand for a new parole eligibility proceeding under § 1983.52

44 See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1250 (2005) (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that habeas relief is limited to right to be released from custody, shorter prison sentence, or lower prison security level); supra note 35.
45 See id. at 1251 (contrasting prisoner who demands right to release to prisoner who
demands proper procedure).
46 See id. (comparing case at bar to hypothetical prisoner who failed to exhaust
all of
his state remedies in a habeas proceeding contesting the length of his confinement).
47 See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1252 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that erroneous parole determinations and procedures lead to continued confinement, which is what the
prisoners are challenging); id. at 1252-53 (arguing that the Court's holding regarding state
parole procedures is contrary to the distinction between challenged to confinement and
challenges to condition of confinement).
48 See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1252 (2005) (rejecting narrow interpretation of habeas
corpus because prior cases consistently held that federal courts may broadly construe a
claim as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus); supra note 34.
49 See id. at 1254 (positing that federal courts should defer to state courts concerning
constitutionally of state parole procedures as a matter of comity and to better enable federal
courts to decide cases about state parole procedures).
'o See id. at 1247-48 (articulating that state prisoner can pursue § 1983 claim if underlying confinement or sentence is not challenged).
51 See id. at 1248 (emphasis in original) (reasoning that parole procedures are not part
of underlying conviction or sentence because neither Dotson or Johnson assured earlier
release from prison if procedures later declared invalid).
52 See id. (stating challenges to parole procedures do not fall within § 1983's
"implicit
habeas exception"). Cf supra note 23.
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As Justice Kennedy correctly articulated in his dissent, however, the
Court's decision undermines prior cases that pointed to habeas corpus, if
available, as the exclusive remedy for prisoners. 53 Rather, the Court ignored the distinction between challenges to prison conditions and confinement thereby permitting prisoners to bring § 1983 suits that are properly
brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 54 Circuit splits as to the
nature of a prisoner's § 1983 claim are inevitable because lower
federal
55
exception.
habeas
defined
clearly
a
on
rely
longer
no
courts can
Justices Thomas and Scalia's concurring opinion offers a resolution
to this dilemma - that a prisoner must bring his challenge to parole procedures under § 1983 because habeas corpus is not an available remedy.56
Dotson's claim did not challenge the conditions of his confinement; it alleged that the Ohio Parole Board merely used the wrong procedures to
conclude that he was not entitled to a parole decision at all.57 On the other
hand, Johnson's claim that the Ohio Parole Board wrongly denied his application for parole release is appropriately litigated as a habeas petition
because the core of the claim is that the Ohio Parole Board allegedly
reached the wrong result. 58 Realistically, Johnson probably would not
53 See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1252-53 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (pointing
out that
challenges to all parole procedures require a habeas proceeding and § 1983 suit is improper); Preiser,411 U.S. at 489 (recognizing Congressional intent that habeas corpus is
proper remedy for attacks on imprisonment or sentence "and that specific determination
must override the general terms of § 1983"); see also Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,
775 (1987) (noting that federal courts should broadly construe scope of habeas corpus).
54 See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1252 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
possibility that new parole proceeding might not result in earlier prison release does not obviate that
challenge to parole procedures contests continued confinement); supra note 35.
55 Compare supra note 35, with Franceski, No. 04 Civ. 8667 (LBS), 2005 WL
821703, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 8, 2005) (interpreting Wilkinson to allow "the possibility that
some claims by a federal prisoner might be cognizable" under both § 1983 and in habeas
corpus), and Osborne v. District Atty's Office for the Third Judicial Dist., 423 F.3d 1050,
1055 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating, "§ 1983 and habeas are not always mutually exclusive").
56 See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1250-51 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that prisoner not entitled to release and therefore not entitled to writ of habeas corpus if
he successfully sues state parole board for procedural error in parole hearing); DeWalt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that prisoner could bring § 1983 claim
for loss of prison job as habeas not an available remedy because he challenged condition of
confinement); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 21 (2nd Cir. 1999), (holding that prisoner
could bring § 1983 claim for constitutional violations during prison disciplinary proceedings because habeas not appropriate remedy).
57 See Dotson v. Wilkinson, 300 F.3d 661, 662 (6th Cir. 2002) (articulating that
Dotson challenged Ohio Parole Board's application of new parole guidelines to deny parole
hearing); Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1248 (recognizing that if Dotson wins § 1983 suit "it
means at most new eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of a new
parole application") (emphasis in original); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555 (allowing prisoner lawsuit under § 1983 to proceed with respect to prison procedures used to deny good time
credits); supra note 34.
58 See Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 1245 (explaining that Johnson's § 1983 claim arises
from alleged procedural deficiencies at hearing to determine whether he would be released
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have brought his § 1983 action if the Ohio Parole Board decided to release
him on parole. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy in cases similar to
Johnson's because the Court should allow state governments the first opportunity to correct invalid procedures used in a parole determination proceedings; immediate federal review of state parole determination proce59
dures is contrary to the principles of comity the Court strives to preserve.
In Wilkinson v. Dotson, the Court narrowed the habeas corpus exception to § 1983 federal prisoner litigation. The Court's holding that
prisoners may bring § 1983 suits to challenge the constitutionality of parole eligibility and parole determination procedures opens the door to §
1983 litigation that is properly pursued under the federal habeas statute.
Moreover, the Court's holding as it pertains to parole determination procedures is contrary to prior case law forbidding prisoners to bring § 1983
actions that would impugn the length of their sentence. As a matter of
comity, the state should have the first opportunity to correct unlawful state
procedures in parole determination hearings while the prisoner exhausts his
state remedies under habeas corpus.
Rachel Rod

at an earlier date); id. at 1251-53 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that parole suitability
proceedings challenge continued confinement and must be pursued under habeas statute);
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (distinguishing between prisoner suit for
wrong procedures used in imposing prison sanctions and prisoner suit for constitutional
violations as a result of those sanctions); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555 (stating that federal restoration of good time credits to inmates impugns prisoner's continued confinement; Morales,
514 U.S. at 503 (explaining that prisoner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality of parole suitability proceedings); supra note 35.
59 See supra note 22.

